The 1967 war produced a change: it was the third consecutive Arab defeat (there is one more) but it was the second for Pan-Arabism. It was a mortal blow for Nasser’s leadership. For the Arabs, the defeat had a devastating moral effect, which is why they call the combat Naksa (backward). If in 1947, the partition of Palestine had divided the emerging Arab nation, the Israeli expansion of 1967 was seen as a humiliation for the Arabs. The 1967 war resulted in a qualitative change. Israel achieved what is known in military terms as “strategic depth” to stop being “in shooting range of the enemy”, as it had been for the past 20 years. On the other hand, the capitals of the enemy countries were under the eyes of the IDF. However, Israel was not clear on what they were going to do with the conquered part. The western vision was not unequivocal. Israel stopped mustering sympathy from the left (not communist) and the progressives. In 1967 it was perceived as an “occupying” power as they were seen in their colonial days. The Palestinian issue acquired a new dimension because of the union of the mentioned factors and because of the thousands of Palestinians who went to live under direct Israeli military control. The damages resulting from the Palestinian-Israeli military contact were perceived in the second and third generations of Palestinian-Arabs, those who had not known about the Jordan (and Egyptian) occupation and began the Intifada of 1987. After the Six-Day War, in August 1967, the Arab countries convened in Khartoum (Sudan) and issued a declaration known as the “Three NOs of Khartoum: No peace with Israel, No recognition of Israel, No negotiations with Israel”. After 1967, there was much more to discuss about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict than the Arab-Israeli one.