The Second Intifada can be explained with two facts: 1) the decision of Yasser Arafat to reject the proposals by Clinton and Barak to form an independent Palestinian state that would finally put an end to Palestinian claims. According to the well-known analyst, Ehud Yari, “Yasser Arafat preferred to continue being the Palestinian Saladin than the president of a poor country that would have to acknowledge the existence of Israel”; 2) The sensation, among the Palestinians, that Hezbollah had defeated the Israeli Defense Army in the south of Lebanon (because of the unilateral withdrawal), and therefore, “it was possible” to defeat the Israeli army. It was a psychological impulse. The Second Intifada was planned previously. Mamdouh Nofal, the authority of the security forces of the Fatah, prepared to begin violence after the failure of Camp David. “He (Arafat) said to us: ‘Let’s go to combat! We have to be prepared’. When Ariel Sharon visited the mosques, Arafat said to us: ‘Ok, this is the moment to act’” (David Samuels, “In a Ruined Country”, The Atlantic, September 2005). Marwan Barghouti, leader of the Intifada, acknowledged that the Intifada was under preparation; the events of Al-Aqsa worked as an opportunity due to the religious mobilization of the Palestinians, as had happened before during the times of the Mufti and as would happen later with the stabbings of 2015. On Sep/28/2000, Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount and on Sep/29/2000 the massive protests began. Palestinians and soldiers fought each other in the Al-Aqsa Mosque, resulting in 7 deceased Palestinians and 70 injured Israelis. If the first Intifada of 1987-88 was characterized by stone-throwing against soldiers and tanks; this time it was an armed combat, with Palestinian suicidal attacks as the main feature during the revolt.